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Smith v. Howard County:
Permanent Injunction
Against "Chilling"
Fifth Amendment Rights
by Professor Byron L. Warnken

n 1974, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Law-Enforcement
Officers' Bill of Rights_ l "The purpose of LEOBOR was to guarantee to
those law-enforcement officers embraced
therein procedural safeguards during investigation and hearing of matters concerned with disciplinary action against the
officer. ... In enacting the LEOBOR, the
Legislature vested in law-enforcement officers certain 'rights' not available to the
general public." 2 Section 728(b) of the
LEOBOR establishes procedural safeguards
for law-enforcement officers under investigation or subject to interrogation. Section 733 prohibits actual or threatened
punitive personnel action for the exercise
or demand of rights under the LEOBOR
or constitutional rights.

I

In Smith v. Howard County, 3 the Howard
County Police Department alleged that
Officer Harry Smith used a cassette tape
recorder to tape a conversation between
himself and one of his superior officers.
He was formally notified that he was under
investigation for this alleged conduct and
was ordered to answer questions. Officer
Smith was told that his failure to answer
questions could result in the commencement ofan action leading to punitive measures in the form of sanctions up through
and including dismissal.
Officer Smith sought and obtained an ex
parte temporary injunction against the Police Department from taking or threatening to take punitive personnel action in
return for his exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-

incnmmation or his rights under the
LEOBOR. In the subsequent hearing concerning a permanent injunction, the Police Department took the position that
(1) injunctive equitable relief was not the
appropriate remedy, (2) the right to be a
police officer is dependent upon a willingness to forego constitutional rights, (3) Officer Smith would only be subjected to departmental disciplinary action and would
not be subjected to criminal charges, and
(4) any answers that he was forced to provide would be inadmissible in any criminal
proceeding under the LEOBOR. Chief
Judge Guy J. Cicone of the Circuit Court
for Howard County rejected the arguments
of the defendant and permanently enjoined
the Police Department from taking or
threatening any punitive personnel action
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against Officer Smith as a result of the assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.

The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination was made
applicable against the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1964. 4 The following year,
in Griffin v. California,s the Supreme
Court held that a "chilling effect" upon
the exercise of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is just as much a
constitutional violation as actually compelling self-incriminating testimony. The
Court prohibited both jury instructions
and prosecutorial comment that permit
the drawing of a negative inference from a
defendant's silence, exercised in Onffin
through an election not to testify. "[C]omment on the refusal to testify ... is a penalty imposed by the courts for exercising
a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion
costly." 6
Two years ~fter Griffin, the Supreme
Court decided the companion cases of
Garrity v. New Jersey 7 and Spevak v.
Klein. 8 In Garrity, police officers were interrogated for an alleged conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws.
They were informed that, although they
had a right not to answer, if they exercised
their right to remain silent, they would be
subject to removal from office. The officers answered the questions, their answers
were admitted into evidence in their subsequent criminal trials on conspiracy
charges, and they were convicted. The Supreme Court framed the issue as ''whether
a State, contrary to the requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, can use the threat
of discharge to secure incriminating evidence against an employee."9 The Court
held that the statements were coerced in
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
The Court emphasized that police officers
"are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights [and] a State
may not condition [the exercise of a constitutional right] by the exaction of a price." 10
In sum, "[t ]he option [presented to the police officers] to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to
speak out or remain silent." 11 In Holloway
v. State,12 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland noted that statements controlled
by Garrity are involuntary as a matter of
law. In Widomski v. Chief of Police of Baltimore City,13 the court recognized that Garn'ty, as applied in Holloway, would pro4- The Law ForumlSpn'ng, 1987

hibit ordering a police officer, under threat
of disciplinary action, to take a polygraph
test,
In the companion case to Gam'ty, Spevak
v. Klein,14 the Supreme Court followed
the Gam'ty analysis, holding that a state
cannot disbar an attorney because of the
refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry. The
Court posited that an individual cannot
enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed unfettered exercise of the right to remain silent if there may be a penalty for asserting
that right. "[T]hreat is indeed as powerful
an instrument of compulsion as the use of
legal process to force from lips ... the evidence necessary to convict .... " 15

"In enacting the
LEOBOR, the
Legislature vested
in law-enforcement
officers certain
'rights' not available
to the general
public. "

The year after Garrity-Spevak, the Supreme Court decided the companion cases
of Gardner v. Broderick l6 and Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commission
of Sanitation. 17 In Gardner, a police officer
was advised of his constitutional rights
and further advised that, if he did not
waive his right and waive immunity from
prosecution, he would be fired. He refused
to waive his constitutional rights and was
discharged solely for that refusal. Recognizing that the facts in Gardner went beyond those in Garrity, the Court framed
the issue as ''whether a policeman who refuses to waive the protections which the
privilege guarantees him may be dismissed

from office because of that refusal." 18 The
Court found Garrity controlling and reversed the appellate court's affirmance of
the trial court's dismissal of the officer's
petition for reinstatement. The Court's rationale was articulated as follows:
He was discharged from office not for
failure to answer relevant questions
about his official duties, but for refusal
to waive a constitutional right. He was
dismissed for failure to relinquish the
protections of the privilege against
self-incrimination....
[T]he mandate of the great privilege
against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver
of the immunity it confers on penalty
of the loss of employment. It is clear
that petitioner's testimony was demanded ... in part so that it might be
used to prosecute him, and not solely
for the purpose of securing an accounting of his performance of his public
trust. If the latter had been the only
purpose, there would have been no
reason to seek to compel petitioner to
waive his immunity. 19
In DiGrazia v. County Executive for
Montgomery County,20 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that even a police
chief who was a political appointee, and
who therefore could be replaced by another appointee within the absolute discretion of the county executive, could not
be terminated because of the exercise of
his constitutional rights. The court quoted
from Mt. Healthy City Board of Education
v. Doyle,21 wherein the Supreme Court
stated: "The constitutional principle at
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position
than ifhe had not engaged in the conduct.
A borderline or marginal candidate should
not have the employment question resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct." 22
In the companion case to Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commission of Sanitation,23 fifteen sanitation
workers were discharged, twelve because
of their assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination
and three because of their refusal to waive
immunity from prosecution. The Court
made the following factual finding, upon
which it based its holding.
Petitioners were not discharged
merely for refusal to account for their
conduct as employees of the city. They
were dismissed for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right
against self-incrimination. They were

discharged for refusal to expose themselves to criminal prosecution based
on testimony which they would give
under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege. 24
Relying upon Garrity and Gardner, the
Court reversed the judgment that had affirmed the dismissal of their action for a
declaratory judgment and for injunctive
relief.
The final relevant Supreme Court authority is Lefkowitz v. Turley,25 in which
architects were disqualified from public
contracts because of their refusal to waive
their privilege against compelled selfincrimination and their refusal to waive
immunity from prosecution, both with respect to their governmental transactions.
The Court declared that Garrity, Gardner
and Sanitation Men were controlling, stating that a "waiver secured under threat of
substantial economic sanction cannot be
termed voluntary."26 The Court added
that if a governmental agency needs the information to the point of compelling testimony, the State must provide both immunity and the power of the courts to
compel testimony, after a grant of immunity, through civil contempt proceedings. 27
In Smith v. Howard County,28 the conduct for which Officer Smith was required
to report and answer questions was the
alleged cassette tape recording of a conversation between himself and a superior officer. The alleged conduct is criminal under
section 10-402 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated. 29
Subsection (a) prohibits the interception,
disclosure or use of certain wire or oral
communication. Subsection (b) establishes
that the offense is a felony, subject to five
years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
Officer Smith was not charged with a violation of any departmental regulation and
the alleged conduct does not violate any
departmental regulation. Thus, the charge
could only be brought, and the unrefuted
testimony was that it was brought, solely
by virtue of the felony criminal statute.
Consequently, Officer Smith's counsel informed the Police Department that his
client would appear as required, but would
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. The
response of the Police Department was
that Officer Smith's failure to answer questions "could result in commencement ofan
action which may lead to punitive measures" in the form of sanctions up through
and including dismissal.
The defendant relied upon two cases in
an attempt to counter the plaintiff's constitutional argument. The first case, Christal v. Police Commissioner of San Fran-

ciSCO,30 was relied upon for the proposition
that the right of a police officer to keep his
or her job is dependent upon the officer's
willingness to forego constitutional rights.
Officer Smith argued that this 1939 California intermediate appellate opinion was
handed down, without reliance upon Supreme Court authority, twenty-five years
before the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and twenty-six years before the first
of the six Supreme Court decisions, which
together established the sanctity of the
right to the unfettered exercise of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
The other case, Nichols v. Baltimore Police Department,3l was relied upon by the
defendant as dispositive of the self-incrimination issue. Officer Smith, on the other
hand, argued that the issue before the
court was controlled by the Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. In Nichols, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland addressed
only the limited issue of the meaning of
selection 728(b)(lO) of the LEOBOR, determining the extent to which a police officer and his or her representative may
consult in order to enter objections to a
question asked by an interrogator. Chief
Judge Gilbert, writing for the court, stated
the obvious-that the legislature, in enacting the LEOBOR, could not have provided less rights than the supreme law of
the land embodied in the Constitution. 32
The General Assembly likewise recognized
this when it enacted section 733 as part of
the LEOBOR.

A law-enforcement officer may not
be discharged, demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or
otherwise discriminated against in regard to his employment or be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of his exercise ofor demand for the
rights granted in this subtitle, or by
reason of the lawful exercise of his
constitutional rights. 33
The plaintiff further argued that the
case before the court was distinguishable
from Nichols and that there was nothing in
Nichols that conflicted with either the Supreme Court's decisions or the plaintiff's
position. In Nichols, ChiefJudge Gilbert,
in analyzing subsection (b)(lO) of section
728, stated that it was
concerned solely with investigations or
interrogations involving possible violations of non-criminal department policies. Otherwise, the full panoply of

Miranda would be applicable, and subsection 728(b)(lO) would be mere surplusage, since Miranda is founded on
the supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, any attempt by State law to
restrict Miranda's application would
be futile. 34

Not only did Chief] udge Gilbert hold that
the lone subsection before the court addressed only "non-criminal departmental
policies," he found that the complaint
against Officer Nichols was that he " 'shirked
... [his] responsibilities,''' 35 and thus the
"interrogation is, in appellant's case, strictly
non-criminal." 36 It was in this context that
Chief Judge Gilbert wrote the language
upon which the defendant relied.
The commander may order the officer
to answer the question, and if that order is refused, the officer in all likelihood faces a charge of disobeying the
commander's direct order. Dismissal
from the department is a possible, if
not probable, product of the disobedience. In short, the officer, confronted
by not answering a question or disobeying a direct order of his or her
commander, is placed in the position
of choosing between facing a tiger or
facing a lion. Either choice might
prove fatal to the officer's career in
law-enforcement. 37
Officer Smith argued that this language
was inapplicable to the investigation of
him for alleged felonious conduct and that
it merely restated, in other words, the
teachings of the Supreme Court, particularly that provided in Gardner v. Broderick. 38 If the sole purpose of an investigation is an accounting of job performance,
without any potential criminality, then,
and only then, is an order to answer questions, under threat of loss of job, constitutionally permissible. The purely noncriminal context of ChiefJudge Gilbert's
language in Nichols is demonstrated by his
follow-up statement. ''Notwithstanding the
degree of difficulty which the officer faces
when put to a Hobson's choice, the Legislature never intended to permit an officer,
under investigation for such non-criminal
matters, to stifle the interrogation or investigation to the point where it is for all practical purposes non-existent." 39
In granting the permanent injunction in
Smith v. Howard County, Chief Judge
Cicone appeared unpersuaded, particularly
in light of the plaintiff's uncontraverted
evidence, by the defendant's assertion that
it considered this matter purely non-criminal, departmental and administrative in
nature. In any event, the assertion by the
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Police Department that it considered the
investigation non-criminal would not be
controlling. An individual may refuse "to
answer official questions put to him in any
... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal
or informal, when the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." 40 As long as there is potential for
criminal charges arising from the conduct,
the right to remain silent is absolute. U nless there has been a constitutionally sufficient grant of immunity,41 the person being interrogated is, effectively, the final
authority of the applicability of the right to
remain silent.42

The Law-Enforcement Officers'
Bill of Rights
It is ironic that, when a Police Department interrogates one of its officers, under
threat of punitive disciplinary action for
refusal to answer questions, the LawEnforcement Officers' Bill of Rights could
be argued to afford the officer less rights
than would otherwise be available. First,
as Chief] udge Gilbert recognized in Nichols v. Baltimore Police Department,43 the
Constitution of the United States controls
over the LEOBOR.44 Second, the express
language of the LEOBOR provides that
"[a] law-enforcement officer may not be
... threatened with [discharge or other adverse personnel action] by reason of his exercise of ... his constitutional rights."45
Thus, both the Fifth Amendment and the
LEOBOR preclude threatened or actual
penalty for assertion of the right to remain
silent. Third, the legislature, in enacting
the LEOBOR in 1974, intended to provide more rights - not less - to police officers under investigation. "The purpose of
the LEOBOR was to guarantee to those
law-enforcement officers embraced therein
procedural safeguards during investigation .... In enacting the LEOBOR, the
Legislature vested in law-enforcement officers certain 'rights' not available to the general public." 46 Fourth, section 728 (b)(7)(i)
of the LEOBOR provides that "[t]he lawenforcement officer under interrogation
may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal or disciplinary action." 47
Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment
and the language of the LEOBOR just
presented, section 728 (b)(7)(ii) provided
the other basis for the defendant's argument in Smith v. Howard County. That
section reads in part:
This subtitle does not prevent any
law-enforcement agency from requiring a law-enforcement officer under
investigation to submit to ... interrogations which specifically relate to the
6- The Law Forum/Spring, 1987

subject matter of the investigation.
This subtitle does not prevent a lawenforcement agency from commencing
any action which may lead to a punitive measure as a result of a law-enenforcement officer's refusal to submit
to ... interrogation, after having been
ordered to do so by the law-enforcement agency. 48
The defendant argued that subsection
(b)(7)(ii) supports the position that a police officer must answer potentially incriminating questions or be subject to dismissal
for the refusal to answer such questions.
Officer Smith argued that, if that is what
subsection (b)(7)(ii) means, then Garrity
v. New Jersey49 and Gardner v. Broderick 50 would render the statute unconstitutional as applied in any situation, unless
the questions related to matters with no
potential for criminality. However, instead
of arguing the unconstitutionality of section 728 (b)(7)(ii), Officer Smith used principles of statutory construction to reconcile it with the Fifth Amendment, with
section 728 (b)(7)(i) and with section 733.
First, as to the constitutionality of the
statute, all statutes are presumed to be constitutional. The legislature is presumed to
be aware of existing law, which includes
the United States Constitution. 51 The legislature is presumed, in light of that knowledge and the oath of office, to enact legislation that is constitutional. If the legislature enacts a statute that is both plain on its
face and unconstitutional, it must be struck
down. 52 However, because of these presumptions, if there is any ambiguity in the
statute and there is any reading of the statute that will render it constitutional, it
must be so interpreted. 53

Second, as to the reconciliation of
subsection 728 (b)(7)(ii) with subsection
728 (b)(7)(i), as well as with section 733,
statutes must be read as a whole. 54 No
statute should be read in such a manner as
to render any portion of it superfluous,
meaningless or nugatory. 55 When interpreting the LEOBOR, the determination of
the constitutionality of subsection (b)(7)(ii),
as well its reconciliation with the remainder
of the statute, both produce the same result. The first step is to eliminate what
subsection (b)(7)(ii) does not mean; the
second step is to discover what it does
mean.
Subsection (b)(7)(ii) does not provide
any police department with the authority
to take or threaten punitive personnel action in return for the assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. First, Garrity and Gardner make any such action unconstitutional.
Second, section 728 (b)(7)(i) provides that
"[t]he law-enforcement officer under interrogation may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action." 56
Third, section 733 provides that "[a] lawenforcement officer may not be [subjected
to punitive personnel action] or be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of
his exercise of or demand for the rights
granted in this subtitle, [e.g., the right not
to be threatened under section 728 (b) (7)(i) ]
or by reason of the lawful exercise of his
constitutional rights, [e.g., the right against
compelled self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment]." 57 Thus, to read subsection (b)(7)(ii) as authorizing threatened
or actual dismissal for assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege would not only be
unconstitutional, it would "write out" of
the statute subsection (b)(7)(i).

Officer Smith argued that there is only
one possible reading of section 728 (b)(7)(ii)
that renders it consistent with section
728 (b)(7)(i), with section 733 and with the
Fifth Amendment. Subsection (b)(7)(i)
provides that "[t]he law-enforcement officer under interrogation may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal or disciplinary
action."58 Subsection (b)(7)(ii) provides
that "[t]his subtitle does not prevent a lawenforcement agency from commencing any
action which may lead to a punitive measure as a result of a law-enforcement officer's refusal to submit to ... interrogation,
after having been ordered to do so by the
law-enforcement agency."59 Thus, if a police department complies with all of the
provisions of the LEOBOR, subsection
(b)(7)(ii) authorizes it to require one of its
officers to participate in an investigation
and report for an interrogation session.
This is consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Only the defendant in a criminal
trial may assert the ''blanket'' Fifth Amendment privilege of refusing to even take the
stand. In all other settings, the individual
must submit to the interrogation process. 60
However, even though the individual must
submit to the interrogation process, he
may refuse "to answer official questions
put to him in any ... proceeding, civil or
criminal, formal or informal, when the
answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings." 61 The perfect analogy is the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. "Refusal to submit to interrogation"
can result in incarceration for contempt of
court. However, once "under interrogation," the individual may assert, as to any
and all questions, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Subsection (b)(7) (i) recognizes
that constitutional privilege, as well as the
Supreme Court decisions precluding any
threats that may create a "chilling effect"
upon that privilege.
The final argument presented by Officer Smith was in response to the following
language in section 728 (b)(7)(ii). "The
results of any ... interrogation, as may be
required by the law-enforcement agency
under this subtitle are not admissible or
discoverable in any criminal proceedings
against the law-enforcement officer when
the law-enforcement officer has been ordered to submit." 62 He argued, and the
defendant conceded, that this was not an
immunity provision under which the Office of the State's Attorney could grant immunity and compel the testimony.
There is no inherent or common law
power of immunity. It exists only when
the legislature (or the Constitution) expressly authorizes a grant of immunity. 63
Maryland has only a few immunity stat-

utes, each limited to a particular offense
that the legislature has found difficult to
investigate and prosecute withOll.t the testimony of those involved in the crime. 64
Maryland does not have a general immunity statute, and this is certainly not due
to an oversight on the part of the legislature. At least five general immunity bills
have failed in the General Assembly since
1978. 65
There are three kinds of immunity.
From most broad to most narrow, they are
(1) transactional immunity, (2) use plus derivative use immunity, and (3) use immu-

CCThis decision could
affect the manner
in which police
departments
throughout the
State respect the
constitutional rights
of their officers."

nity. "Transactional immunity" prohibits
the prosecution of all criminal transactions
about which the individual is compelled to
testify. Almost all of Maryland's limited
number of immunity statutes provide transactional immunity. 66 "Use plus derivative
use immunity" is the minimum needed to
satisfy the Fifth Amendment by "giving"
as much as it "takes away".67 Use plus derivative use immunity "guarantees the compelled witness not simply that his words
will not be used against him directly, but
also that they will not be used indirectly as
leads to the development of derivative evidence."68 Once a prosecutor gives a consti-

tutional grant of immunity, pursuant to an
express immunity statute, "his only guarantees of adequate testimonial performance
are the threat of contempt and the threat of
perjury."69 Mere "use immunity", on the
other hand, ~s constitutionally defective as
a "trade off" to compel testimony in the
face of an assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Use immunity merely guarantees
that the compelled testimony will not be
used against the compelled witness.
There is nothing in section 728(b)(7)(ii)
to permit reading it as an express grant of
immunity by the legislature. If it did provide for a grant of immunity, it would be
Maryland's first general immunity statute,
applying to all crimes if the alleged perpetrator were a law-enforcement officer. The
LEOBOR was designed to provide more
rights-not less-to law-enforcement officers. If police officers are the only citizens
upon whom immunity may be "forced" for
all crimes, it is clear they would be receiving less rights than the average citizen, because immunity is "no favor" to the one
immunized.
Formal immunity is not necessarily the
subject of a bargain and is frequently
forced upon a reluctant witness against
that witness's will. A witness is summoned to testify at a trial or before
a grand jury. The witness claims the
privilege against compelled testimonial
self-incrimination. The State, upon
explicit statutory authorization, may
then officially and upon the record
confer a grant of the appropriate form
of immunity upon the recalcitrant witness, whether that witness wishes it or
not. 70
Moreover, if section 728(b)(7Xii) were an
immunity statute, it would permit enforcement of a grant of immunity not simply by
the judicially approved methods of threat
of contempt and threat of perjury, but by a
new threat, that of disciplinary action and
loss of employment.
In the alternative, Officer Smith argued
that if section 728(b)(7Xii) is an immunity
statute, it is unconstitutional, because it
neither protects him from prosecution for
any transaction for which his testimony is
compelled, nor does it protect him from
both the use of the statements as evidence
and the use of the statements as leads to
develop derivative evidence. Section 728
(b)(7)(ii) is merely an exclusionary device,
rendering his statements inadmissible as
evidence, which is constitutionally insufficient to compel testimony from an individual desiring to exercise his unfettered Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent without
penalty.
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Conclusion
Upon announcing in open court his order
for a permanent injunction, Chief Judge
Cicone noted that Officer Smith did not
relinquish any of his constitutional privileges by virtue of accepting employment
as a Howard County Police Officer. Our
society, which rightfully demands from
our police officers that they not infringe
upon our constitutional rights, must similarly demand for our police officers that
they receive their constitutional rights.
Consider the following: (1) a superficial
reading by police superiors and their legal
advisers of certain language out of context,
in either or both Nichols 71 and section
728(b)(7)(ii) of the LEOBOR,72 (2) the
pari-military nature of any police force,
(3) the ability to deprive an accused officer
of his entitlement to future employment,
and (4) the extent of interest and inquiry
from attorneys throughout the State since
the permanent injunction in Smith v.
Howard County. This decision could affect the manner in which police departments throughout the State respect the
constitutional rights of their officers.
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